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Introduction
In view of both the costs and the skills required to gather information, not all investors are 
necessarily equally informed, resulting in there being both informed and uninformed investors. 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Chang et al. (2008:376) described information asymmetry as 
the situation where some investors have access to private information (‘informed investors’) 
while others only possess publicly available information (‘uninformed investors’). The 
separation of ownership (investors) and control (management), coupled with conflicting 
incentives between investors and managers, may further result in management having superior 
information about the company, relative to the investors. Information asymmetry may therefore 
exist, either between the management of a company and its investors, and/or between investors 
themselves. Akerlof (1970) first pointed out the negative effects of information asymmetry 
on the effective functioning of markets. Amongst others, information asymmetry hinders the 
ability of investors to distinguish between good and bad investment opportunities (Healy & 
Palepu 2001), creates additional costs through promoting adverse selection (Leuz & Verrechia 
2000:92; Welker 1995:802) and decreases liquidity levels (Gajewski & Li 2015:117; Lev 1988).
Empirical studies to date that have examined the effect of disclosure on information asymmetry 
produced mixed results. Possible reasons for such mixed results include: different proxies used 
for disclosure and information asymmetry; different research methodologies (e.g. sample 
selected); and the characteristics of the country where the data were obtained (e.g. developing or 
developed countries).1
1.Ajina, Sougne and Lakhal (2015), for example, found a significant negative relationship between disclosure and bid-ask spread as 
information asymmetry proxy, but no significant relationship between disclosure and price impact as information asymmetry proxy.
Background: Information asymmetry manifests when one party has more or better information 
than the other. Information asymmetry is said not only to increase transaction costs and 
decrease liquidity, but also to diminish the quality of the investment decisions taken by 
investors, thus weakening the overall functioning of markets.
Aim and setting: A well-developed Internet investor relations (IIR) strategy, coupled with 
increased disclosure levels, should theoretically decrease information asymmetry levels. The 
majority of related studies to date used either an indirect disclosure proxy or involved an 
examination of the annual report, and have used data from United States or European 
companies. Empirical studies to date have produced mixed results. The aim of this study was 
to ascertain whether a relationship exists between the quality of IIR (via corporate websites) 
and information asymmetry.
Method: This study used data from Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies. 
Multiple regression analysis was applied with information asymmetry as dependent variable 
and IIR as one of a set of selected explanatory variables. A self-constructed measurement 
instrument was used to measure IIR for a sample of 85 companies. Given the inherent difficulty 
with direct observation of information asymmetry, three different proxies were used to 
estimate information asymmetry.
Results: A significant negative association was found between IIR and information asymmetry 
for all three information asymmetry proxies that were used: bid-ask spread, price impact, and 
analyst following.
Conclusion: Empirical support is provided for the notion that companies may potentially 
benefit from a well-developed IIR strategy through reduced information asymmetry.
The link between Internet investor relations 
and information asymmetry
Note: This article is partially based on the first author, George F. Nel’s dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
in Business Management and Administration at Stellenbosch University, with Promotor Prof. E.v.d.M. Smit and co-promotor Prof. L. 
Brummer, received December 2016, available here: http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/100275
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The majority of related studies to date have either used 
an indirect disclosure proxy (i.e., a proxy that is not based 
on an examination of the original disclosure vehicle), for 
example, analyst ratings issued by the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (Botosan & Plumlee 
2002; Brown & Hillegeist 2007), or based on an examination 
of the annual report (Ajina et al. 2015; Cheng, Courtenay & 
Krishnamurti 2006; De La Bruslerie & Gabteni 2011). 
Studies that entail an examination of the original disclosure 
vehicle (e.g. content analysis using a measurement 
instrument) may be regarded as direct disclosure proxy 
studies (Hassan & Marston 2010). As no reliable analyst 
ratings suitable for use in this study exist in South Africa, 
and owing to the inherent shortcomings and diversity of 
alternative measurement instruments (as discussed in 
the literature review), a self-constructed measurement 
instrument was deemed appropriate.
The corporate website as a communication medium has 
specific advantages for both companies and investors. 
For companies, it is cost-effective and flexible in format, 
and for investors, it may potentially be an easy, quick, cheap, 
complete, reliable and up-to-date source of information. 
Although there exists a substantial amount of research 
measuring the use of corporate websites as communication 
channel, both in South Africa (Barac 2004; Esterhuyse & 
Wingard 2016; Loxton 2003; Nel & Baard 2006; Venter 2002) 
and internationally (Aerts, Cormier & Magnan 2007; Chang 
et al. 2008; Froidevaux 2004; Gajewski & Li 2015; Orens et al. 
2010; Trabelsi, Labelle & Dumontier 2008), the measurement 
instruments used by such studies are often criticised (as 
discussed in the literature review) and few of these studies 
explicitly measured investor relations.
The purpose of this study was to test for the association 
between the quality of Internet investor relations (IIR) 
and information asymmetry by examining the corporate 
websites of a sample of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-
listed companies. Gray, Radebaugh and Roberts (1990) 
found that voluntary disclosure items (e.g. IIR) that are 
perceived to be useful in one country are not always valuable 
in other countries. Aerts et al. (2007) and Orens et al. (2010), 
for example, documented variations in the associations 
between disclosure and information asymmetry given the 
institutional regime.
Literature review
The purpose of the literature review is threefold: to clarify 
the theoretical basis for the research, to review the literature 
regarding the measurement of IIR and information 
asymmetry, and to identify independent variables, besides 
IIR, co-producing variations in information asymmetry.
(footnote 1 continues...)
Regarding the characteristics of the country where the data were obtained, Orens, 
Aerts and Cormier (2010) found a significant negative relationship between 
disclosure and bid-ask spread using data from Continental European listed 
companies, but no significant relationship using data from Northern American listed 
companies.
Disclosure and information asymmetry
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) proposed two theories to 
explain how disclosure quality relates to information 
asymmetry.
According to theory 1, depicted by the upper branch in 
Figure 1, disclosure quality will decrease either one or both of 
the available sets of private information and the expected net 
benefits of searching for private information, which results in 
a decrease in private information search activities. Private 
information will thus lose its value once the information is 
published (e.g. on a corporate website), and disclosure 
quality will, therefore, decrease the available set of private 
information.
Public information will also reduce the incentives for 
investors, either to gather information privately or to buy the 
information from information intermediaries. Disclosure 
quality will therefore diminish the expected net benefits for 
investors to search for private information, which is already 
freely available publicly.
Theory 2, as depicted by the lower branch in Figure 1, is 
based on the argument that as information asymmetry 
depends on the balance between the informed and the 
uninformed (Gajewski & Li 2015:117), disclosure quality will 
decrease information asymmetry through reducing the 
relative amount of privately-informed trading. Based on the 
investor recognition hypothesis (Merton 1987), uninformed 
investors are more likely to invest in companies with which 
they are familiar. The lower branch of Figure 1, however, 
suggests that increased levels of uninformed trading may 
also increase the levels of informed trading.
Although Brown and Hillegeist (2007:472) found a positive 
association between disclosure and uninformed trading, 
they concluded that this association is offset by a positive 
association between disclosure quality and the level of 
informed trading. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) therefore 
conclude that the association between disclosure quality 
and information asymmetry is primarily driven by theory 1.
Disclosure
quality
Uninformed
trading
Informed
trading
Informaon
asymmetry
Relave amount
of  privately
informed trading
(theory 2)
Less private
informaon
search acvies
(theory1)
Available set
of private
informaon
Expected net 
benefits of 
searching for 
private
informaon
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(+)
Source: Brown, S. & Hillegeist, S.A., 2007, ‘How disclosure quality affects the level of 
information asymmetry’, Review of Accounting Studies 12(2), 448. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11142-007-9032-5
FIGURE 1: The relationship between disclosure, private information search 
activities, privately informed trading and information asymmetry.
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In view of the fact that investors require information in order 
to evaluate investments, they will either: (1) privately gather 
the required information; (2) buy the required information 
from other information intermediaries who have already 
collected and analysed the information; (3) not invest in the 
company; or (4) make a wrong investment decision (Healy & 
Palepu 2001). In view of the cost and the knowledge required 
to gather information, not all investors will be equally 
informed. Private information in the context of this study 
therefore refers to information that is most probably available 
in the public domain but, due to cost and/or time constraints, 
is not available to all investors – the so-called uninformed 
investors.
Ashbaugh, Johnstone and Warfield (1999:255), on the other 
hand, reason that IIR may increase or decrease information 
asymmetry across investors. If all investors have equal 
access to and expertise in the use of corporate websites as 
information source, IIR may decrease information asymmetry, 
but, if not, IIR may actually increase information asymmetry. 
Given the development of information technologies since 
1999, specifically the increased levels of accessibility to the 
worldwide web (Internet), it follows that investors have since 
consolidated achieving equal access and greater expertise 
in the use of corporate websites as information source. 
Ashbaugh et al. (1999) further argued that IIR would increase 
information asymmetry if IIR activities were dominated 
by unreliable information communicated to uninformed 
investors, stressing the importance of reliable and useful IIR.
Measurement of Internet investor relations
Marston (1996:477) defined investor relations as the link 
between a company and the financial community by means 
of which information is provided (i.e., disclosed) to the 
financial community as basis for the evaluation of the 
company. The activities of investor relations embody a range 
of information or disclosure types, for example mandatory 
and voluntary, financial and non-financial, as well as 
shareholder services to facilitate relationship management 
and/or strategic marketing.
Measurement instruments devised in the literature to 
measure the use of corporate websites as communication 
channel, frequently fall short in key aspects (Nel & Brummer 
2016) by:
•	 ignoring important attributes (e.g. by merely measuring 
the level of financial reporting on corporate websites 
without attempting to measure the wider concept of 
investor relations and presentation-related attributes);
•	 not attempting to distinguish between quantity and 
quality or to measure quality;
•	 using weights without a clear rationale; and
•	 failing to perform the required reliability and validity 
tests.
The measurement instrument used in this study is further 
discussed in the methodology section.
Measurement of information asymmetry
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000:98) argued that as it is not possible 
to observe information asymmetry directly, an appropriate 
proxy should be used. A number of studies have used 
different proxies for information asymmetry (e.g. Ajina et al. 
2015; Fu, Kraft & Zhang 2012; Gajewski & Li 2015; Orens et al. 
2010). Three are retained here – the quoted or relative bid-ask 
spread, price impact, and analyst following. For reasons 
discussed below, the following proxies were not used: analyst 
forecast accuracy, time-weighted average spread, effective 
spread, depth-adjusted effective spread, and the probability 
of informed trading. 2
Analyst forecast accuracy is based on analyst forecast 
dispersion. At least two analyst forecasts are required to 
calculate this measure and, as only 30 of the companies in the 
study sample are followed by two or more analysts, it was 
decided not to use this proxy. To calculate the time-weighted, 
effective, and depth-adjusted effective spread, as well as the 
probability of informed trading, intraday data are needed. 
Given, firstly, the difficulties of accessing intraday data and, 
secondly, the similarity of results derived from alternative 
proxies,3 intraday-based proxies were not utilised.
Bid-ask spread
The bid-ask spread, also known as the width or tightness, is 
calculated as the difference between the bid and the ask price. 
Of all the variations of the bid-ask spread used in the 
literature (e.g. quoted or relative, time-weighted relative, 
effective and depth-adjusted effective spreads), the quoted 
bid-ask spread is the most popular.
Chang et al. (2008:382) asserted that periods of high 
information asymmetry are characterised by uninformed 
traders that revise their bid and ask prices away from the 
market to decrease the probability of trading with an 
informed investor. The bid-ask spread therefore has a positive 
correlation with information asymmetry and if IIR decreases 
this adverse selection, it should result in a narrowing of the 
bid-ask spread.
Price impact
Liquidity can be described using three dimensions: width 
(bid-ask spread), market depth, and slippage (Kyle 1985). 
2.Although share turnover (e.g. Cheng et al. 2006; Orens et al. 2010) and share price 
volatility (e.g. Cheng et al. 2006; Leuz & Verrechia 2000) are sometimes used as 
information asymmetry proxies and were tested as such in this study, the results 
thereof are not reported due to inherent limitations in the research design (e.g. 
endogeneity). For completeness’ sake, IIR was found to be a significant positive 
independent variable (at 5%) and, together with share price, share price volatility 
and free float (all significant and positive), explained 51% (R²) of the variation in 
share turnover. Share turnover was measured as the average daily of the rand 
volume of shares traded scaled by the market capitalisation (over-all trading days 
from 01 December 2014 to 30 November 2015). With regard to share price volatility, 
no significant association was found between IIR and share price volatility where 
the latter was measured as the natural logarithm of the annualised share price 
volatility as on 30 November 2015.
3.Gajewski and Li (2015) studied the relationship between internet-based disclosure 
and information asymmetry. They used five proxies for information asymmetry (i.e., 
quoted spread, effective spread, time-weighted spread, probability of informed 
trading [PIN] and adjusted PIN) and found negative associations with disclosure for 
all five proxies. Ajina et al. (2015) found statistically-significant negative relationships 
between both the quoted and the effective bid-ask spread, and their disclosure 
proxy (voluntary disclosure in annual reports).
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Slippage (also referred to as market resilience) captures the 
ability of investors to trade in a share without affecting its 
price. The price impact ratio was developed by Amihud 
(2002) to capture slippage and is positively correlated with 
information asymmetry. If IIR increases liquidity and 
decreases information asymmetry, it should be negatively 
related to the price impact ratio as small changes in the share 
price will result in a lower price impact ratio.
Analyst following
Lang and Lundholm (1996) argued that both the effectiveness 
of analysts monitoring, as well as market efficiency in a 
particular company’s shares, are improved if the number of 
analysts following the company increases.
Merton (1987) and Agarwal et al. (2016:35) argued that an 
effective investor relations programme increases analyst 
following. Healy and Palepu (2001), on the other hand, 
argued that one can either reason that companies 
which disclose more information attract more analysts by 
supporting these analysts to create superior forecasts, or that 
additional disclosure reduces the opportunities for analysts, 
implying a lower demand for their services leading to a 
lower analyst following.
Based on the argument that reliable analyst monitoring and 
ratings may potentially both increase uninformed trading 
(theory 2 in Figure 1) and decrease private information 
search activities (theory 1 in Figure 1), as discussed earlier, 
for present purposes a negative association between analyst 
following and information asymmetry was hypothesised.
Determinants of information asymmetry
Independent variables, beyond IIR, used in the literature to 
explain variations in information asymmetry, are discussed 
in this section.
Share price
The microstructure of financial markets stipulates that the 
share price should explain liquidity (Ajina et al. 2015:1228). 
Significant negative associations have been documented 
between share price and the following information 
asymmetry proxies: quoted bid-ask spread (Ajina et al. 2015; 
Healy, Hutton & Palepu 1999; Welker 1995), time-weighted 
spread (Chang et al. 2008) and effective spread (Ajina et al. 
2015; Heflin, Shaw & Wild 2005).
Our study expected a negative association between share 
price and each of the following: bid-ask spread and price 
impact, while a positive association was expected between 
share price and analyst following.
Leverage
Theoretical arguments are used in the literature to hypothesise 
both positive (Aerts et al. 2007; Boot & Thakor 1993) and 
negative associations (Brown & Hillegeist 2007) between 
leverage and information asymmetry.
Boot and Thakor (1993) argued that higher levels of 
leverage will stimulate private information production, 
which will increase information asymmetry. In support of 
arguments for a positive association, Orens et al. (2010) 
found a significant positive association between leverage 
and the bid-ask spread.
Our study expected a positive association between leverage 
and each of the following: bid-ask spread and price impact. A 
negative association was expected between leverage and 
analyst following.
Share price volatility
According to Orens et al. (2010:1072), share price volatility 
results from disagreements between buyers and sellers, 
and can therefore be associated with the requirement of 
higher risk premiums, which, in turn, will increase the 
bid-ask spread. Share price volatility indicates the degree 
of uncertainty or risk (Gajewski & Li 2015) used as a 
measure of the price risk that investors have to bear 
(Welker 1995:808).
Bhushan (1989:271) found a positive association between 
share price volatility and analyst coverage, suggesting that 
the demand for analysts’ services is higher for companies 
with a higher risk, as measured by share price volatility. Our 
study expected a positive association between share price 
volatility and each of the following: bid-ask spread, price 
impact, and analyst following.
Ownership structure
Information asymmetry is related to the extent to which 
privately-informed trading takes place and to private 
information search activities. Large institutional investors 
not only have the resources to generate private information, 
but also benefit from economies of scale – which will further 
decrease their information acquisition cost relative to smaller 
retail investors.
The present study has used two ownership structure proxies, 
directors’ shareholding and free float. Our study expected a 
positive association between directors’ shareholding and 
each of the following: bid-ask spread and price impact; while 
a negative association was expected between directors’ 
shareholding and analyst following. For free float, on the 
other hand, negative associations were expected with the 
bid-ask spread and price impact, and a positive association 
with analyst following.
Share turnover
Trading volume consists of both informed and uninformed 
trading. As discussed, it can be hypothesised that informed 
trading increases information asymmetry and uninformed 
trading decreases information asymmetry. Ajina et al. (2015) 
argued that increased levels of trading volume may cause 
disequilibrium in the market, resulting in extra costs that 
have to be recouped by the enlargement of the spread.
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Although the relationship between share turnover and 
information asymmetry is therefore somewhat ambiguous, 
the majority of studies to date found a negative association 
between share turnover, as independent variable, and 
information asymmetry, as dependent variable. Our study 
expected a negative association between share turnover, as 
independent variable, and each of the following: bid-ask 
spread and price impact. Analysts would be attracted to 
more visible companies. A positive association between share 
turnover, as independent variable, and analyst following was 
therefore expected.
Dual listing
Multiple stock exchange listings are often associated with 
increased transparency and increased disclosure (Ajina et al. 
2015:1229; Orens et al. 2010:1070). Our study expected a 
negative association between having a dual listing and each 
of the following: bid-ask spread and price impact. A foreign 
listing may, however, stimulate analyst activity in the foreign 
country, as foreign investors will experience more information 
asymmetry compared to domestic investors, thereby creating 
a demand for analyst research in the foreign country (Aerts et 
al. 2007:1311). Our study expected a positive association 
between having a dual listing and analyst following.
Methodology
Measurement of Internet investor relations
The measurement instrument was developed by means 
of a four-step methodology: review of best practices as 
published by the United Kingdom Investor Relations Society 
(http://irsociety.org.uk/); an extensive literature review of 
existing instruments; a pilot study; and, finally, a reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) and construct validity assessment based 
on the IIR measurement results, resulting in a measurement 
instrument that consists of 346 attributes, organised into 
11 categories.4 The maximum IIR score that could be achieved 
was 346. More specifically, quality of IIR is assessed by, 
first of all, measuring information content in as detailed a 
manner as possible; second, by measuring the presentation 
of information (i.e. accessibility, timeliness and navigation); 
and, finally, by allowing for the measurement of attributes as 
only partially available (scored as 0.5) based on breadth, 
timeliness and usability.
A sample of 25% of JSE-listed companies was selected using 
stratified (JSE industry) random sampling with proportional 
allocation per JSE sector. The population was defined as all 
companies5 currently listed on the JSE that had not been 
4.The 11 categories are: accessibility, navigation, timeliness, company information, 
financial information, relevant news, investment case, shareholder information, 
bondholder information, corporate governance and corporate responsibility. Space 
precludes the publication of the full measurement instrument, but all issues in the 
development of the instrument (e.g. reliability and validity tests performed) are 
comprehensively dealt with in Nel and Brummer (2016). The full measurement 
instrument, as well as the measurement conventions followed in the measurement 
process, is further available from the author on request.
5.Both companies listed on the Main Board and AltX were included in the population. 
Although it is acknowledged that AltX companies might have different trading 
behaviour (e.g. liquidity) and ownership structures compared to companies listed 
on the main board, they were specifically included for the following reasons: 
smaller companies are more likely to use their disclosure policy to influence market
suspended, had traded since the inception date, had 
published 2013 annual reports, and had a dedicated, working 
website. A total of 85 companies were included in the sample. 
All IIR measurements were done from March to September 
2015.
Information asymmetry
Table 1 provides a brief description of how each information 
asymmetry proxy was calculated, as well as the expected 
association with IIR.
In theory, the first two proxies listed in Table 1, bid-ask spread 
and price impact, are positively related to information 
asymmetry and the last one, analyst following, negatively.
Additional independent variables
The stepwise regression method was used to examine 
the relationship between IIR and each of the three proxies 
used for information asymmetry. Besides IIR, additional 
independent variables were used in the regression analysis 
to explain further variation in information asymmetry. 
Table 2 summarises the calculation of these variables.
Data collection
All dependent and independent variables were captured 
from the INET BFA database with the exception of dual 
listing and free float that were obtained directly from the 
JSE, and IIR which was measured using the measurement 
instrument discussed above.
Endogeneity
Various studies to date have cautioned that disclosure, and 
therefore IIR, should be treated as an endogenous variable 
when studying the effects of voluntary disclosure on 
information asymmetry (Chang et al. 2008; Core 2001; Leuz & 
Verrechia 2000; Orens et al. 2010; Welker 1995). If not 
accounted for, the endogeneity problem will result in 
(footnote 5 continues...)
perceptions (Lang & Lundholm 2000) and research that found significant 
associations between disclosure/investor relations and, respectively, the cost of 
equity (Botosan 1997) and analyst following (Agarwal et al. 2016) for smaller 
companies/companies with a low analyst following, but none for larger companies/
companies with a high analyst following.
TABLE 1: Information asymmetry proxies – Description and expected IIR 
association.
Information 
asymmetry proxy 
Description Predicted 
direction 
Bid-ask spread Natural logarithm of the median of the daily 
difference between the last offer or ask (selling 
price) and last bid (buying price) scaled by the 
daily average of the last offer and last bid price 
(over all trading days from 01 December 2014 
to 30 November 2015) 
–
Price impact Natural logarithm of the median of the daily 
absolute return scaled by the daily rand value 
of shares traded (over all trading days from 01 
December 2014 to 30 November 2015)
–
Analyst following The number of analysts following the company, 
that is, the number of analysts that issue e.g. 
earnings per share forecasts per company as 
available on the INET BFA database 
+ 
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spurious results and incorrect conclusions. Hence, the 
Wu-Hausman test was used to test for endogeneity.
Results
As a result of extremely thin trading, the bid-ask spread 
was not available for one company, as this company’s 
shares only traded for 40 days over the measurement 
period. The sample was therefore reduced to 84 companies. 
All the results reported pertain to the reduced sample. 
The natural logarithm (ln) of the bid-ask spread, price 
impact, share price volatility and share price were used to 
reduce skewness. However, the descriptive statistics in 
Table 3 are presented prior to the use of any natural 
logarithmic transformations in the multivariate regression 
analysis.
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the three information asymmetry proxies and the independent 
variables.
All the coefficients reported in Table 4 are as expected, 
except in three instances. First, no significant association 
between dual listing and any of the three information 
asymmetry proxies was found. Dual listing was, however, 
found to be significant, and negative as expected, in the 
regression model where the bid-ask spread was used as 
information asymmetry proxy.
Second, the association between leverage and information 
asymmetry was expected to be positive in the case of the first 
two proxies (bid-ask spread and price impact) and negative 
in the case of the last one, analyst following. Table 4, however, 
depicts associations contrary to what were expected.
Lastly, a positive association was expected between 
share price volatility, as independent variable, and analyst 
following, as information asymmetry proxy. Although Table 
4 depicts a negative association, a significant and positive 
association was found in the respective regression model, as 
discussed below (see Table 7).
Table 5 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the independent variables.
The high correlations between share price and share price 
volatility, and free float and share turnover send cautionary 
signals that tolerance values should be carefully monitored 
for signs of multicollinearity.
As discussed above, the Wu-Hausman test is used to test for 
a potential endogenous problem. An instrumental variable 
is needed to perform the Wu-Hausman test. For the purpose 
of this study, being audited by a big four audit company 
was used as the instrumental variable. Being audited by a 
big four audit company is highly significant and positively 
related to the endogenous independent variable, IIR, 
(Nel, Smit & Brummer 2017:63), but is not correlated with 
information asymmetry. The Wu-Hausman test results are 
showed in Table 6.
The Wu-Hausman test also tests for the strength of the 
instrumental variable used. For each of the three information 
asymmetry proxies tested in this study, the Ho hypothesis 
that the instrumental variable is a weak instrument was 
tested. As the p-values in Table 6 indicate, all three hypotheses 
were rejected, thus showing the strength of the instrumental 
variable used.
Next, the Ho hypothesis that IIR is an exogenous variable 
was tested. As the p-values in Table 6 indicate, none of these 
hypotheses were rejected. All three Ho hypotheses were 
TABLE 2: Independent variables used to explain information asymmetry: 
Description.
Variable Description 
Share price Natural logarithm of the average daily closing share 
price (over all trading days from 01 December 2014 to 
30 November 2015)
Leverage Ratio between debt and assets
Share price volatility Natural logarithm of the annualised share price 
volatility as on 30 November 2015 
Free float percentage Ratio between the total issued shares minus restricted 
shares to the total issued shares 
Directors’ shareholding 
percentage 
The percentage of direct and indirect, beneficial and 
non-beneficial shareholding of directors 
Share turnover Average daily of the rand volume of shares traded 
scaled by the daily market capitalisation (over all 
trading days from 01 December 2014 to 30 November 
2015)
Dual listing Dummy variable representing one if the company is 
dually listed on the JSE or any other stock exchange, 
and zero if otherwise 
TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics.
Panel Variable Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviationQ1 Q2 Q3
A: Dependent 
variables
Bid-ask spread 0.0472 0.0011 0.0028 0.0065 0.0394 0.4783 0.0876 
Price impact 254.60 2.96 7.36 21.11 125.49 3 540.92 626.75 
Analyst following 2.31 0 0 1 3 11 3.33 
B: Continuous 
independent 
variables
Internet investor relations (IIR) 98.70 13.50 69.25 96.25 130.63 193.50 42.73 
Share price R65.79 R0.03 R4.04 R18.89 R111.46 R696.21 R102.40 
Leverage 0.45 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.61 1.21 0.24 
Share price volatility 51.40 17.68 26.23 35.16 57.24 455.89 54.74 
Free float % 59.43 2.50 36.00 60.00 87.50 100 28.70 
Directors’ shareholding % 13.93 0.00 0.09 2.80 23.23 81.79 20.58 
Share turnover 0.0015 0.00003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0022 0.0049 0.0012 
C: Categorical 
independent 
variables
- 1 0 Total - - - -
Dual listing 25 59 84
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therefore accepted, thus showing that IIR is not an 
endogenous independent variable. Similar results were 
found by Cheng et al. (2006) and Gajewski and Li (2015). The 
ordinary least square regression model is therefore used in all 
further analyses discussed in the remainder of this article.
Table 7 presents the results of the stepwise regressions.
A minimum tolerance value of 0.31 confirmed the absence of 
multicollinearity. Residual plots of predicted versus residuals 
were examined. From these residual plots no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity was found for the bid-ask spread and 
price impact model. The residual plot for analyst following, 
however, depicts evidence of heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-
Pagan test for heteroscedasticity confirmed the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. The regression results reported in Table 7 
are before adjustments were made for heteroscedasticity. 
Regression results, adapted for heteroscedasticity, are 
discussed below.
Bid-ask spread
As depicted in Table 7, the coefficient for IIR is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of all other 
independent variables are as expected and highly significant, 
except for dual listing that is only significant at the 10% level.
For the sample of JSE companies the following hold in 
accordance with theoretical expectation: the negative IIR 
coefficient indicates that enhanced IIR reduces the level of 
the bid-ask spread, and therefore information asymmetry. 
Most studies to date that have found a similar negative 
association, have used either an indirect disclosure proxy 
(e.g. analyst ratings) or measured the annual report as 
disclosure vehicle. However, Gajewski and Li (2015) and 
Orens et al. (2010) have found a negative association based 
on a measurement of corporate website disclosure.
On the other hand, Chang et al. (2008) found no significant 
association between spread and their measurement of the 
quality of a company’s IIR activities. Chang et al. (2008:386) 
suggested two possible reasons for this non-significant 
association:
•	 Website investor relations information may be perceived 
to be less credible by investors compared to annual 
report-provided disclosures; and
•	 The possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
disclosure and spread, suggesting that that there may be 
an upper limit in the reduction of spread as disclosure 
quality improves.
The magnitude of the reported adjusted R² of 91% compares 
favourably with studies such as Gajewski and Li (2015) 
reporting an adjusted R² of 60%, Welker (1995) 63%, Ajina et 
al. (2015) 74%, Leuz and Verrechia (2000) 81%, and Cheng et 
al. (2006) 85%.
Although various studies have used share turnover as 
independent variable in their regression models to explain 
variations in bid-ask spread levels (e.g. Ajina et al. 2015; 
Gajewski & Li 2015), a reverse causality relationship may 
exist between share turnover and the bid-ask spread. If share 
turnover as independent variable is removed from the 
regression model reported in Table 7, dual listing does not 
remain as a significant independent variable in the final 
regression result. Share price, IIR and share price volatility 
are, however, still highly significant at 1%, and free float 
remains as significant independent variable (direction of all 
coefficients as expected) with only a slight decrease in the 
adjusted R² to 88% from the 91% reported in Table 7.
Price impact
As depicted in Table 7, the coefficient for IIR, for the 
JSE sample, is negative and significant, but only at the 
10% level. The coefficients of all other independent variables 
are as expected and highly significant. The negative IIR 
coefficient indicates that enhanced IIR improves the ability 
of investors to trade in a share without affecting its price, 
resulting in increased liquidity levels and decreased 
information asymmetry.
TABLE 4: Correlation matrix: Information asymmetry and independent variables.
Independent variables Dependent variables
Bid-ask spread Price impact Analyst following 
Internet investor relations -0.64*** -0.57*** 0.57*** 
Share price -0.88*** -0.79*** 0.55*** 
Leverage -0.26** -0.26** 0.24** 
Share price volatility 0.79*** 0.74*** -0.25** 
Free float -0.50*** -0.57*** 0.34*** 
Directors’ shareholding 
percentage
0.35*** 0.35*** -0.26** 
Share turnover -0.63*** -0.76*** 0.66*** 
Dual listing -0.09 0.05 0.14 
***, Significant at the 1% level; **, significant at the 5% level; [*significant at the 10% level].
TABLE 5: Correlation matrix: Independent variables.
Variable IIR SP LEV SPV F.FLT DIR.SH STO LIST.D 
Internet investor relations 1.00 - - - - - - -
Share price 0.52*** 1.00 - - - - - -
Leverage 0.36*** 0.29*** 1.00 - - - - -
Share price volatility -0.33*** -0.76*** -0.25** 1.00 - - - -
Free float 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.03 -0.31*** 1.00 - - -
Directors’ shareholding -0.31*** -0.26** -0.01 0.20* -0.39*** 1.00 - -
Share turnover 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.17 -0.28** 0.65*** -0.29*** 1.00 -
Dual listing 0.26** 0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.05 -0.31*** -0.01 1.00 
***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.
IIR, Internet investor relations; SP, share price; LEV, leverage; SPV, share price volatility; F.FLT, free float; DIR.SH, directors’ shareholding; STO, share turnover; List.D, dual listing.
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Compared to the bid-ask spread as information asymmetry 
proxy, few studies have used the price impact ratio as 
measure of information asymmetry giving rise to mixed 
empirical results. Fu et al. (2012), for example, found the 
expected negative association, whereas Ajina et al. (2015) 
found no significant association. Neither of these two studies 
however measured corporate website disclosure levels or 
investor relations levels. Fu et al. (2012) used an indirect 
disclosure proxy, namely financial reporting frequency, 
and Ajina et al. (2015) measured annual report voluntary 
disclosure levels. Fu et al. (2012) reported an adjusted R² of 
36% and Ajina et al. (2015) a higher 67%, but with a non-
significant disclosure coefficient.
Analyst following
Table 7 shows the expected positive association between IIR, 
significant at the 5% level, and analyst following for the JSE 
sample. The coefficients of all other independent variables 
are as expected and significant.
The Breusch-Pagan test confirmed the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. Corrected for heteroscedasticity, by 
applying heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation of the 
covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates, the IIR coefficient 
remained positive with the level of statistical significance 
unchanged at 5%. In the adapted regression model, the 
statistical significance of the share price volatility variable, 
however, increased to the 1% level.
Orens et al. (2010:1078) discussed a problem of endogeneity 
with the extent of disclosure. They argued that either 
financial analysts are more likely to follow companies with 
more disclosure or companies may disclose more in order 
to attract more analysts. As discussed, the Wu-Hausman 
test results confirmed the absence of endogeneity. Similar 
results (i.e., significant association between analyst 
following and IIR, as well as the absence of endogeneity) 
were reported by Abdelsalam, Bryant and Street (2007:20).
As a high analyst following could lead to a high share 
turnover, a reverse causality relationship may exist between 
share turnover and analyst following. If share turnover as 
independent variable is removed from the regression model 
reported in Table 7, all independent variables (IIR, share 
price and share price volatility) remain significant. Although 
the adjusted R² decrease to 43% from the 54% reported in 
Table 7, the statistical significance of both IIR and share price 
volatility increases from 5% to 1% (direction of all coefficients 
as expected).
Conclusion
Of the three proxies used for information asymmetry in this 
study, the bid-ask spread is not only the most popular 
and theoretically appealing proxy, but it also provides 
the strongest empirical support for a negative association 
between IIR and information asymmetry. The majority of 
studies about disclosure and information asymmetry have, 
however, been performed using developed country data and 
have either used analyst ratings as disclosure proxy or have 
measured the annual report as disclosure vehicle. This study 
therefore not only provides further empirical support for a 
negative relationship between disclosure and information 
asymmetry, but more specifically provides support for the 
investor recognition hypothesis that states that a well-
developed investor relations programme improves visibility 
and decreases information asymmetry. Specifically in respect 
of IIR, this study provides further support for the findings of 
Gajewski and Li (2015) who used a French sample, but 
contradicts the findings by Chang et al. (2008) who found no 
association using an Australian sample.
Although used far less as information asymmetry proxy, 
price impact seems to capture an important measure of 
liquidity, which is the ability of an investor to trade without 
affecting the share price. Empirical support for a negative 
association between disclosure and price impact is, however, 
weak and unstable. This study not only provides strong 
empirical support for a negative association between IIR and 
price impact, but also provides further support for the 
continuous use of price impact as illiquidity and information 
asymmetry proxy. Although analyst following is considered 
a less precise measure of information asymmetry, the positive 
association between IIR and analyst following support the 
arguments by Merton (1987) and Agarwal et al. (2016) that an 
effective investor relations programme will increase analyst 
following.
This study therefore provides further evidence in support of 
economic theory that postulates a relationship between 
disclosure and information asymmetry, by using developing 
country data and through the examination of corporate 
websites as communication medium.
Based on research that found that annual report disclosure 
levels are positively correlated with disclosure levels 
through corporate investor relations and other publications 
TABLE 6: Wu-Hausman results: Internet investor relations as independent 
variable and information asymmetry as dependent variable.
Dependent variable Weak instrument p-value IIR exogenous p-value
Bid-ask spread 0.02 0.79
Price impact 0.01 0.28
Analyst following 0.01 0.31
TABLE 7: Regression results.
 Variable Bid-ask spread Price impact Analyst following
Constant (β0) -5.36*** 0.68 -11.21***
IIR -0.01*** -0.004* 0.02**
Share price -0.61*** -0.28** 1.468***
Share turnover -368.84*** -840.77*** 1 133.06***
Share price volatility 1.109*** 1.449*** 1.50**
Dual listing -0.26* - -
Adjusted R² (%) 91.18% 89.55% 54.14%
F-value 172.57 178.84 25.49
***, Significant at the 1% level; **, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
IIR, internet investor relations.
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(Lang & Lundholm 1993) and the voluntary nature of IIR, 
this study contributes to international accounting literature 
by providing further support for the advantages of voluntary 
disclosure in an accounting context. Given the advantages of 
a reduced level of information asymmetry, knowledge about 
the circumstances under which and how these may be 
achieved would enable companies to optimise their IIR 
strategies.
Whereas several investor relations communication channels 
are available to companies, for example, media releases, 
investor presentations, social media (e.g. Twitter) and 
corporate websites, the current study examines only one of 
these channels, namely the corporate website.
Given the recent growth in social media channels such as 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, further research is needed 
on how companies use social media to communicate with 
investors, and to examine the effect thereof on information 
asymmetry. Blankespoor, Miller and White (2014), for 
example, found that the communication of company-initiated 
news via Twitter is associated with lower bid-ask spreads 
and higher liquidity.
Economic theory links information asymmetry to the share 
price and the cost of capital. This warrants the need for future 
research to examine the association between IIR, and the 
share price and cost of capital.
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